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1Abstract
This paper develops a measure of segregation based on two premises: (1) a measure of
segregation should disaggregate to the level of individuals, and (2) an individual is more
segregated the more segregated are the agents with whom she interacts. Developing three
desirable axioms that any segregation measure should satisfy, we prove that one and only one
segregation index satisﬁes our three axioms, and the two aims mentioned above; which we
coin the Spectral Segregation Index. We apply the index to two well-studied social phenom-
ena: residential and school segregation. We calculate the extent of residential segregation
across major US cities using data from the 2000 US Census. The correlation between the
Spectral index and the commonly-used dissimilarity index is .42. Using detailed data on
friendship networks, available in the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, we
calculate the prevalence of within-school racial segregation. The results suggests that the
percent of minority students within a school, commonly used as a substitute for a measure
of in-school segregation, is a poor proxy for social interactions.
21 Introduction
Ethnic and racial segregation is an important and well-studied social phenomenon. For over
50 years, social scientists have been concerned with measuring the extent, and estimating
the impact of segregation in education, housing, and the labor market. The result of this
scholarship has been nearly 20 diﬀerent indexes of segregation, and a consensus that the
spatial separation of many minorities from jobs, role models, health care, and quality local
public goods is a leading cause of racial and ethnic diﬀerences on many economic, social, and
health related outcomes (Almond, Chay, and Greenstone 2003, Borjas 1995, Case and Katz
1991, Kain 1968, Cutler and Glaeser 1997, Massey and Denton 1993, Collins and Williams
1999). Fundamental to understanding the potential impact of segregation is measuring it.
We propose a new approach to measuring segregation based on two premises: (1) a
measure of segregation should disaggregate to the level of individuals, and (2) an individual
is more segregated the more segregated are the agents with whom she interacts. Having a
measure of segregation with the ﬂexibility to disaggregate to the level of individuals opens up
windows of opportunity for empirical work, and a better understanding of the mechanisms
by which segregation aﬀects economic outcomes. We also desire a measure that gives a larger
level of segregation for individuals whose contacts are more segregated. Consider Figure 1,
which depicts the distribution of blacks across metropolitan Detroit. There is a large oval
in the center of the city containing almost exclusively black households. Any measure of
segregation should report that the household in the epicenter is more segregated than a
household equidistant from the center and the edge, even when each household has all black
3neighbors. These are two features that are absent in all existing measures of segregation.
We use networks — individuals and their connections — as our mathematical framework.
In this framework, we propose three speciﬁca x i o m st h a ta n ym e a s u r eo fs e g r e g a t i o no na
network should satisfy. We prove that one and only one index satisﬁes these axioms and
the two broad principles above; which we coin the “Spectral Segregation Index” (SSI). The
axioms require that: (a) [Monotonicity] if all individuals in Network A have more interactions
with agents of the same race than in Network B, then Network A is more segregated than
B; (b) [Linearity] an individual is more segregated the more segregated are the agents with
whom she interacts, and this relationship takes on a linear form; and (c) [Homogeneity] if
all individuals in a network have half of their interactions with members of the same race,
the index of segregation is one-half. The latter condition normalizes the index.
We defer a formal deﬁnition of the SSI to Section 4. Informally, the SSI measures the
connectedness of individuals of the same race. Put diﬀerently, the SSI captures the growth
of race-speciﬁc capital in a network. Consider the following thought experiment. Let there
be a network of many individuals. Suppose that, in each period of time, individuals possess
a degree of own-race capital–how adept they are at reciting ‘Tu Pac’ or how well they
whistle Vivaldi. In each time-period they transmit some of their capital to other individuals
of the same race with whom they interact. The SSI will, as time passes, approximate the
growth rate of own-race capital, providing a measure of connectedness and own-race social
interaction. In highly segregated areas (areas with high SSI) same-race fads will grow quickly
because of the frequency of same-race social interactions.
4The SSI has important advantages over existing measures of segregation. First, as a gauge
of residential segregation, it is invariant to arbitrary partitions of a city, in that it does not
depend on the way that local communities choose to draw their census regions. This is im-
portant for a variety of reasons — most crucially having to do with the permanent structure
of census regions and the relative mobility of populations. Second, it allows us to investigate
how segregated multiple minority groups are, allowing one to compare the segregation of
Asians, Blacks, Hispanics, Native Americans, and so on, within and across cities.1 The SSI
makes it possible to compare Hispanic segregation across cities, compare the Hispanics of
east Los Angeles from the Hispanics in south Los Angeles, or compare them to Blacks in
Chicago. Third, our index allows one to analyze the full distribution of segregation, allowing
researches to move beyond aggregate statistics, which can be misleading. For instance, while
the average Black may be more segregated than the average Hispanic, it is plausible that
the most segregated Hispanic is more segregated than any Blacks. Indeed, we ﬁnd that this
is the case for residential segregation in the US. This is potentially an important distinction
for empirical work. Fourth, there are inherent multiplicative eﬀects captured by SSI which
other indexes omit. That is, an individual’s susceptibility to group-transmitted inﬂuences
depends on how many contacts the individuals have with members of the group, and the
susceptibility of her contacts. Fifth, the SSI can be used for calculations of concentration
far beyond the measurement of racial segregation. Natural applications of our index include
1Another way to analyze multiple groups with existing indexes is to calculate the weighted average of
several dichotomous indexes (see Reardon and Firebaugh 2002). It is not clear how to interpret the ﬁndings
from such an exercise.
5the measurement of traﬃc, power in organizations, concentration of buyer-supplier networks,
academic ﬁeld specialization, segregation of friendship networks, measures of social popu-
larity, and so on. Generally, the SSI provides a mathematical tool adept at measuring the
clustering of particular nodes in networks.
The SSI has some disadvantages as well. It depends on the quality of the information one
can obtain about social interactions. In the case of residential segregation, for example, the
information is restricted to where individuals live and not how they interact within a city.
Unlike other indexes, however, as better information on the nature of social interactions is
obtained, the SSI becomes a sharpened proxy of those interactions. Second, it is sensitive
to the fraction of individuals in a network who have the race/ethnicity under study. We
address this issue by calculating a “baseline” SSI, and comparing actual SSI to the baseline.
Finally, implementing the SSI can be computationally demanding, though our applications
demonstrate that the computational tasks are feasible.2
After formally deriving the SSI, we apply the index to two well-known social phenomena:
measuring the extent of residential and school segregation. We begin by evaluating the extent
of segregation across major cities in the US, using data from the 2000 Census. The results
we obtain are interesting, and in some cases quite surprising. The most segregated cities for
Asians (including Paciﬁc-Islanders), Blacks, Hispanics and Whites are Honolulu, HI, Detroit,
MI, McAllen, TX, and Lowell, MA respectively. On average, Blacks are more segregated than
any other racial group, but the most segregated Hispanics are more segregated than the most
2To ease this burden, we have posted results from some of the more computationally intense calculations
on the following webpage: http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/fryer/projects.html
6segregated Blacks. However, the real power of the SSI is the ability to measure segregation at
disaggregated levels, allowing one to measure the intensity of same-race clusters or uncover
the most segregated city blocks in America. The largest minority ghetto in the US consists
of Hispanics in Los Angeles, CA — 17,909 blocks are connected to each other! The second-
largest ghetto is comprised of Blacks in Detroit, MI, and the most segregated ghetto consists
of Blacks in Jackson, MS. The most segregated city block in America is a Hispanic block
in Western San Antonio, TX. It is important to emphasize that the latter results cannot be
obtained with any of the existing measures of segregation.
We also apply the SSI to the measurement of within-school segregation patterns, us-
ing data on friendship networks available in the National Adolescent Study of Health (Ad-
dhealth). Our analysis uncovers many new facts. First, the common practice of using the
percentage of black students in a school as a substitute for within-school segregation mea-
sures, is a poor proxy for actual social interactions. When black students are relatively scarce
in a school, they tend to be integrated. As their share of the student population increases,
segregation increases dramatically, hitting a ceiling when blacks comprise roughly twenty
percent of the student population. Schools that have twenty percent or more black students
exhibit severe within-school racial segregation.
Second, we correlate individual-level segregation with several traits. More segregated
Black students are less likely to smoke (a behavior predominant among white teens) and
have lower vocabulary test scores. More segregated Asians are less likely to skip school, they
have higher vocabulary test scores, put in more eﬀort, and report being happier. Among
7Hispanics, more segregation is associated with less smoking, lower vocabulary test scores,
lower probability of attending college, and lower grades. Students of all races are less likely
to date interracially when schools are more segregated.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides background and a brief
discussion of existing indexes of segregation. Section 3 provides an example that previews
many of the ideas and intuitions involved in the general modeling. Section 4 provides an
axiomatic derivation of our new index of segregation. Section 5 uses the SSI to estimate the
prevalence of residential and school segregation across. Section 6 concludes. There are two
appendices. Appendix A contains the technical proofs of all formal results and Appendix B
provides a theoretical foundation for Baseline SSI.
2 Background and Previous Literature
At an abstract level, segregation is the degree to which two or more groups are separated
from each other. However, practical deﬁnitions can be quite distinct from one another,
conceptually and empirically. Massey and Denton (1988) group existing indexes into ﬁve
classes: evenness, exposure, concentration, centralization, and clustering, which they take to
resemble the totality of what is usually meant by “segregation.” Evenness refers to the
diﬀerential distribution of two groups across areas in a city. Measures of exposure are
designed to approximate the amount of potential contact and interaction between members
of diﬀerent groups. Concentration indexes measure the relative amount of physical space
occupied by a minority group. Centralization is the extent to which a group is located near
8the center of an urban area, and clustering measures the degree to which geographic units
inhabited by minority members abut one another, or cluster spatially. Of the ﬁve dimensions
of segregation, only two are used in the vast majority of applied work in the social sciences:
evenness and exposure. Economists ultimately care about the degree to which segregation
aﬀects social interactions. For this purpose, concentration and centralization are inadequate,
and measures of clustering are largely avoided due to their sensitivity to the number and
population of census regions.
The most popular measure of segregation is the “dissimilarity” index (developed by Jahn,
Schmid, and Schrag 1947), a measure of evenness.3 Suppose a city is divided into N sections.
The dissimilarity index measures the percentage of a group’s population that would have to
change sections for each section to have the same percentage of that group as the whole city.
In symbols:











¯ ¯ ¯ ¯, (1)
where blacki is the number of blacks in area i, blacktotal is the total number of blacks in the
city as a whole, nonblacki is the number of non-blacks in area i, and nonblacktotal is the
number of non-blacks in the city. The dissimilarity index has the appealing feature that it
is invariant to the size of a minority group.
A second commonly-used measure of segregation is “isolation,” a measure of exposure.
3Other measures of evenness include the Gini coeﬃcient (the mean absolute diﬀerence between minority
proportions weighted across all pairs of geographic units, expressed as a proportion of the maximum weighted
mean diﬀerence), the Atkinson index (similar to Gini coeﬃcient, but allows researchers to decide how to
weight geographic units which are over or under the city-wide distribution), and Entropy (the weighted
average of each geographic units deviation from the racial entropy of the city as a whole).
9As Blau (1977) recognized, Blacks can be evenly distributed among residential areas in a
city, but experience little exposure to non-Blacks if they are a relatively large proportion
of the city. Isolation measures the extent to which Blacks are exposed only to one other,
rather than to non-Blacks. The index is computed as the minority-weighted average of each
section’s minority population:






















where personi refers to the total population of area i and persontotal refers to the total
population.4
Dissimilarity and isolation possess at least two undesirable properties. First, they explic-
itly depend on the arbitrary ways in which cities are partitioned into sections (e.g. census
tracts).5 That is, ﬁxing the location of minorities and non-minorities in a city and re-drawing
the sections can drastically change the measure of segregation. An exaggerated example is
depicted in Figure 2. The city depicted in the ﬁgure has a dissimilarity index of 0 — perfect
integration — when sections are drawn vertically and has a dissimilarity index of 1 — extreme
segregation — when sections are drawn horizontally; no household has moved. Similarly, ver-
tical partitions yield an isolation index of 0 whereas horizontal partitions produce an index
of .5. This is a highly undesirable property of any segregation index, as it may artiﬁcially
4Another commonly used measure of exposure is the interaction index, which is the inverse of the isolation
index presented above.
5We are not the ﬁrst to draw attention to this ﬂaw in measures of segregation, see Cowgill and Cowgill
(1951), Appendix A in Tauber and Tauber (1965), and Massey and Denton (1988). While this property
is problematic for measures of residential segregation, it is less likely to eﬀect measures of occupational or
school segregation - where there is a natural clustering of individuals.
10indicate that a city is more or less segregated as a function of how the tracks are drawn.
Second, existing measures are not deﬁned when trying to measure segregation at the
level of individuals. It is diﬃcult to correctly identify the relationship between segregation
and outcomes without individual-level variation in segregation. As a descriptive matter,
individual segregation may be more useful than city-wide segregation. Rather than corre-
late individual economic outcomes with city-wide segregation, one can correlate individual
outcomes with individual measures of segregation. On the other hand, the right level of
aggregation depends on the problem at hand; group-level, neighborhood, or city-level seg-
regation may be the appropriate level of aggregation in many applications. It is an open
empirical question, one that cannot be answered without a measure that disaggregates to
the individual level.6
The literature in economics involving the measurement of segregation is small (Phillipson
1993, Hutchens 2001, Frankel and Volij 2004). Similar to our exercise, their approach is
axiomatic — identifying desirable properties that indexes should possess. But, the literature
takes an arbitrary partition of a city as given, and uses the partition to identify indexes
axiomatically. As such, there is little in common with our approach.
6This critique is conceptual — not purely data driven. That is, existing measures are not equipped to
measure segregation at the level of individuals, irrespective of the available data.
113 A Motivating Example
Before moving to a full description of the model, we present an example where we calculate
our index, and discuss informally some of its properties. Consider City 1, depicted in Figure
3. The nodes in City 1 represent households. Each household can be one of three races:
black, white, or gray. In the ﬁgure, household (A,1) is white, (B,2) is black, (B,4) is gray,
and so on.
There are three steps involved in calculating the SSI for City 1. First, we need to deﬁne
who is a neighbor of whom. Here, we pick a simple deﬁnition; two nodes are neighbors if
they are adjacent.7 In general, however, this is the most important decision in implementing
the index. Second, we represent a minority’s neighborhood relations in a “social-interactions
matrix.” The ij entry of the matrix equals 1/4 if minority-members i and j are neighbors;
o t h e r w i s ei ti s0 . W h y1/4? Black and gray households have 4 neighbors each, and for
the purposes of this example, we assume that their relations with each neighbor is equally
7This restrictive deﬁnition is solely for the purposes of the motivating example.
12intense. For blacks in City 1 the interaction matrix is:
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Similarly, the “gray graph” gives a 4 × 4 matrix.
The interactions matrix is always a given in the calculation of the SSI. Any information
about the intensity of relations between households can (and should) be incorporated in the
matrix. For example, in some applications one can infer the relative importance of particular
interactions. In measuring residential segregation, however, all information regarding inter-
actions is gleaned from geographical distance; the matrix thus looks like the one for City 1,
except households will have diﬀerent numbers of neighbors.
The third and ﬁnal step is to calculate the largest eigenvalue of the matrix, and the
associated eigenvector. The eigenvalue is the SSI. The eigenvector, after normalizing such
that the minority-level SSI is the average of the individual-level values, gives the individual-
13level values of SSI. The results are depicted in Table 1. b Sh denotes the SSI for blacks/grays
while b sh
i denotes the individual-level SSI for each household in City 1.
Table 1: Spectral segregation for Grays in City 1.
i (B,4) (B,5) (C,4) (C,5) b Sh
b sh
i .5 .5 .5 .5 .5
Table 2: Spectral segregation for Blacks in City 1.
i (B,2) (B,3) (C,2) (C,3) (D,2) (D,3) (D,4) (D,5) b Sh
b sh
i .596 .606 .875 .912 .668 .787 .378 .152 .622
Blacks are more segregated than grays. Households (B,2), (B,3), (C,2) and (C,3) are
situated like the grays, thus the blacks must be at least as segregated as the grays. All grays
have the same degree of segregation. The most segregated black household is (C,3), the least
segregated black is (D,5).
The example provides a snap-shot of how an individual measure of segregation allows
the identiﬁcation of new testable implications. If segregation is strongly correlated with
poverty, less schooling, and poor health, we would expect (D,3) to be poorer, less educated,
a n dh a v el o w e rl i f ee x p e c t a n c yr e l a t i v et o(D,5) — all else equal. Further, the SSI allows
one to ask questions that were not possible before. For example, In City 1, who is more
segregated, household (B,2) or household (C,4)? Each has two black neighbors and two
white neighbors. The Spectral index gives a higher level of segregation to (B,2), because
(B,2)’s black neighbors are more segregated than (C,4)’s. If segregation reﬂects the strength
14of a household’s same race social interactions, as a result of who its neighbors are, the Spectral
index seems to capture the right thing.
City 2 in Figure 3 doubles the size of City 1 by adjoining an exact replica. Black and gray
segregation in City 2 is the same as in the original city, because neither blacks or grays have
new neighbors of the same race. The segregation of whites, however, increases substantially
in City 2, as they have become more connected. Notice, if we eliminated columns 6 and 7,
black and gray segregation would increase. In essence, the SSI provides a weighted average
of all the minority components throughout a network.
4 The Spectral Segregation Index
A. Basic Definitions
Let G =( V,E) denote a graph with vertex-set V and edge-set E, E ⊆ [V ]
2. 8 The
elements of V a r ev e r t e x e s( o rn o d e s )o fG, and the elements of E are two-element subsets
of V which represent the edges of G. Vertexes represent the individuals in a network, and
edges represent relationships. The adjacency matrix of G,w i t hV = {1,2,...n}, is the n×n
matrix A =( aij) whose (i,j)− entry aij is 1 i ft h e r ei sa ne d g eb e t w e e ni and j,a n d0
otherwise. Two vertexes are adjacent (or neighbors) if they are connected by an edge.
B. The Model
8We use the most basic notions in Graph Theory. A reader can consult any graph-theory textbook, for
example Diestel (1997). Some of the ideas we use are from the ﬁeld of Spectral Graph Theory; see e.g.
Cvetkovi´ c, D., Rowlinson, P., and Simi´ c, S. (1997) for a comprehensive treatment.
15For each i,j ∈ V let there be a real number rij that measures how much i interacts with
j. Interactions are assumed to be non-negative and bilateral; rij ≥ 0 and rij > 0 if and only
if rji > 0.L e t R =( rij) be the matrix of interaction-measures. R is a non-negative (not
necessarily symmetric) |V |×| V | matrix.
The matrix R is a primitive of our model. One can assume diﬀerent Rs, depending on
the detail with which one can judge how intense interactions are.9 Social science can play a
key role in deriving the matrix R.I f ,t h r o u g hd e r i v a t i o no fa ne c o n o m i cm o d e l ,o rd e t a i l e d
participant observation, we know that there exist peculiar behavioral patterns in the manner
in which individuals interact (Chicagoans never talk with people South of them, Cambridge
residents do not befriend anyone across the Charles, or students rarely interact with other
students outside their school district, e.g.) we can incorporate these behaviors into the
matrix R. It is important to emphasize that as empirical researchers get better information
regarding the structure of social interactions, the index will become a sharpened proxy for
those interactions.
Let H = {1,2,...K} be a ﬁnite set of races and ethnic groups, and let a : V → H denote
an assignment of individuals to a race. Thus, h = a(v) implies that, under assignment a,
9There are many ways to think of constructing R. Our leading example is the neighborhood model.I n
this setup, individuals either interact if they are neighbors or do not interact if they are not (this still leaves
room for indirect interactions: my interactions, through my neighbors, with my neighbors’ neighbors). Thus,
rij ∈ {0,1}. A more relaxed version of the neighborhood model is one in which rij can take one of a number
of ﬁnite values, and where larger values reﬂect longer geographical distances — degrees of “neighborhoodness”
say. For example, let rij be 0 if i and j are further than 10 miles apart, and rij =1if they are 1 mile apart,
rij =0 .9 if they are 2 miles apart, rij =0 .8 if they are 3 miles apart, and so on. An even diﬀerent model is
where there is an interaction time constraint. Suppose that for each i there is a set Fi ⊆ V of individuals








j∈Fi rij ≤ 1. These models are just
a few ways one can derive the matrix of social interaction, R. Our theoretical approach is agnostic on this
dimension. The structure of R is an important decision for applied researchers.
16individual v belongs to race h.L e tA = HV be the set of all such assignments.
G i v e na na s s i g n m e n ta ∈ A and a matrix of social interactions R,l e tβ =( a,R) denote the
assignment-interactions pair. An assignment-interactions pair deﬁnes a matrix of “same-race
interactions,” B(β)=( bij),w h e r ee n t r ybij of B(β) is 0 if a(i) 6= a(j),a n drij if a(i)=a(j).
Let nh(β) be the number of h-race individuals under β,a n dl e tBh(β) be the nh(β)×nh(β)
submatrix of B(β) where the rows (and columns) i are such that h = a(i).W h e n a n
assignment-interactions pair β =( a,R) is understood, we shall abuse notation in two ways:
we denote by h the set of individuals assigned to race h,s oh sometimes denotes a−1(h),a n d
we use Bh to denote Bh(β).F i n a l l y ,l e tGh(β) be the graph with vertex set h,a n dw h e r eij
is an edge if and only if bij > 0.
C. Three Axioms of a Desirable Measure of Segregation
Before describing the axioms, it is useful to introduce a bit more notation. Given β =
(a,R), for an individual i,l e tN
β
i be the set of individuals j that interact with i (rij > 0),
and are the same race (a(i)=a(j)). So N
β
i is the set of neighbors of i in Gh(β).
We say that β
0 =( a0,R 0) has more race h-segregation than β =( a,R) if, under β
0
,e v e r y
agent in race h has at least as many same-race interactions. That is, letting Bh(β)=( bij)
and Bh(β
0)=( b0
ij), bij ≤ b0
ij for all i and j in h. In the simplifying case in which rij ∈ {0,1}
(which we refer to as the the neighborhood model), this occurs when (N
β







i ,f o ra l li ∈ V .














i (β) ≥ 0,a n dSh(a) is the average of the sh
i (a) over i ∈ h.
Our deﬁnition of a segregation index reﬂects our requirement that segregation be mea-
sured at the individual level. Individual segregation is measured in the same units as racial
segregation. Race-h segregation is the average of the segregation of all individuals of race h.
Axiom 1 states that if two graphs have the same number of race-h nodes, then the graph
with more h-segregation is more segregated.
Axiom 1 (Monotonicity) If β
0 has more h-segregation than β,a n dnh(β)=nh(β
0),t h e n
Sh(β) ≤ Sh(β
0).
Our second axiom is a normalization of the index. Let d>0 be a scalar. An assignment-




i bij = d.I n t h e
neighborhood model, an assignment is h-homogeneous if N
β
i has exactly d households for all
i with h = a(i).
Axiom 2 (Homogeneity) Let β be h-homogeneous of degree d,t h e nSh(β)=d.
Our third axiom is the most controversial. We want the segregation of an individual i
to depend on the segregation of the individuals with whom she interacts. Axiom 3 requires
this dependence to take a linear form.
18Let Ci be the connected component of Gh(β) that i belongs to. That is, Ci is the set of
individuals j with some connection to i, those with some connections to the individuals with
some connection to i, and so on. Let SCi(β) be the average segregation (sh
i ) of individuals
in Ci.













D. Interpreting the Axioms
The above axioms are, for the most part, intuitive. We require the segregation of a
household i to depend on how many of i’ sn e i g h b o r sa r et h es a m er a c ea si. Monotonicity
and Homogeneity are expressions of this requirement. Monotonicity requires that if City A’s
same race neighbors have more interactions than City B’s, and they have the same number
of that race, City A exhibits a higher degree of segregation than B. Homogeneity says that
if a city were regular, so everyone has exactly the same amount of same-race interactions,
the index should simply be this fraction. Thus, Homogeneity describes the index’s unit of
measurement; providing a way to interpret a value of the index. If Sh(β)=.4, then we know
that there is more segregation than if every individual of minority h had a weighted average
of one-third of their time with other members of race h, but less than half. Homogeneity
also provides a “scale free” like property: If City A h a sm o r eh o u s e h o l d st h a nC i t yB,b u t
19each household in both cities has the same fraction of same-race neighbors, the index will
report the same level of segregation for both cities.
The linearity axiom is our key innovation. We require sh
i (β) to depend on the strength of
i’s h—speciﬁc interactions. As described in the Introduction, if one considers Figure 1, which
depicts the distribution of blacks across metropolitan Detroit, it seems evident that individ-
uals in the center of the of the city’s black ghetto should be measured as more segregated
than those closer to the edge. Linearity is one embodiment of this requirement.
E. Deriving the Spectral Segregation Index
Fix a race h.L e t Ck, k =1 ,2,...K, be the connected components of Gh(β).A b u s i n g
notation, let Ck also denote the submatrix of Bh with columns (and rows) indexed by the
elements of Ck.L e tλk be the largest eigenvalue of Ck,a n dxk be its associated eigenvector,
normalized so its entries add to one. Note that λk and xk must exist by the Perron-Froebenius
Theorem.











nh(β) and ˆ si(β)=λkxki|Ck|.
The next theorem presents our main theoretical result; that SSI satisﬁes monotonicity,
homogeneity, and linearity, and no other index does.
20Theorem 1 A segregation index satisﬁes Monotonicity, Homogeneity and Linearity if and
only if it is the Spectral Segregation Index.
The key idea in the proof of Theorem 1 is quite simple: Linearity requires that, when





j(β), w h i c hi se q u i v a l e n tt or e q u i r i n gt h a t§Ci(β) be
an eigenvalue of Ck. And, by a corollary to the Perron-Froebenius Theorem for irreducible
non-negative matrices, Ck has exactly one positive eigenvalue. Thus, Linearity is almost by
itself a deﬁnition of the SSI. While not a deep axiomatization of SSI, we think Theorem 1
is still valuable because the three axioms are easy to interpret economically, while the index
itself is not. The axioms allow one to evaluate the relatively basic assumptions behind the
SSI. 10
Without assuming linearity, we would be unable to derive a unique numerical index. If,
for example, the linearity assumption is replaced with a monotonicity condition — higher
segregation among i’s same-race neighbors imply higher sh
i (β) — one cannot pin down a
speciﬁc numerical index. The situation is analogous to that of income distribution measures,
where general properties lead to orderings of Lorenz curves, that do not allow one to compare
any two distributions. 11
We state two additional properties of SSI.
10Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004) provide a characterization of eigenvectors of irreducible matrices in
terms of more primitive axioms. Their methods are not applicable to our problem because we also need–
crucially, in fact–to characterize the eigenvalue. In Palacios-Huerta and Volij’s model, the eigenvalue is
always ﬁxed.
11In our framework a Lorenz-curve-type ordering is readily obtained: let race h be more segregated in β
than in β
0 if the distribution of (
P
j r0
ij) dominates that of (
P
j rij).
21Proposition 1 If i ∈ h has at least one same-race neighbor, ˆ sh
i (β) > 0.I fi has no same-
race neighbors, ˆ sh
i (β)=0 .
Proposition 2 If Ck, k =1...K are the connected components (the irreducible submatri-












and SCk(β) is the largest eigenvalue of Ck.S oˆ Sh(β) is the weighted average of the compo-
nents’ largest eigenvalues.
Proposition 1 says that SSI will identify the isolated individuals in a network, as those
i n d i v i d u a l sh a v ea nS S Io f0. Proposition 2 demonstrates that SSI is the average SSI over the
connected components of Gh(β). These connected components are particularly interesting
in some applications. In residential segregation, they can be interpreted as ghettos, and in
school segregation as same-race cliques.
F. The Economics of SSI.
The three axioms provide the precise assumptions underlying the SSI. An alternative
way to envision the SSI is through a model of group-speciﬁc capital transmission. SSI is a
measure of how fast same-race capital is disseminated as a result of social contacts.12
Here, suppose that Gh(β) is a connected graph; without this assumption, the result will
hold in each connected component of Gh(β).
12We thank Erzo Luttmer for suggesting this interpretation.
22Let xi be a measure of how much race-speciﬁc capital an individual i has. Suppose that,
in each period t, individual i’s h-capital grows depending on how much h-speciﬁc capital her
contacts have, and on how much i interacts with them.
Speciﬁcally, suppose that




and that xi0 is given, for all i. While simple, this model has been used recently to study
cultural transmission in networks (Brueckner and Smirnov 2004) and has a direct link to
SSI.







Proposition 3 shows that we can interpret SSI as the rate of growth of same-race capital.
It follows from a familiar calculation in Perron-Froebenius theory. In economics the result is
reminiscent of the balanced growth result in the theory of Leontief systems (see e.g. Dorfman,
Samuelson and Solow (1958)).
Examples of this type of cultural transmission (or any diﬀusion process) include language
(Lazear 1999) and the choice of ﬁrst names (Fryer and Levitt 2004). In a simple model of
culture and language, Lazear (1999) shows that incentives to assimilate by learning to speak
the native language are decreasing in the size of an ethnic enclave. Fryer and Levitt (2004)
argue that the choice of distinctive ﬁrst names is a cultural expression, and show that this
23practice is more common in highly segregated areas. Both of these papers are consistent with
the basic model of cultural transmission described above and, ipso facto, with our measure
of segregation.
Another interesting feature of SSI is that it captures certain multiplier eﬀects in a network;
this feature is related to the dynamics of the model described in equation 3. An individual’s
susceptibility to own-race inﬂuences (patterns of speech, names, and other race speciﬁc
behavior) depends on how many contacts the individual has with their own-race and the
susceptibility of those contacts.
Consider the following thought experiment, depicted in Figure 4, which captures the
essence of the multiplier eﬀects. Network A in Figure 4 has 3 individuals of the same race
and one individual (4) of a diﬀerent race. To illustrate the multiplier eﬀects captured in SSI,
Network B changes the race of Individual 4 to be identical to the others.
1234ˆ S
Before 0.67 0.67 0.67 0 0.5
After 0.78 0.78 0.91 0.42 0.72
Table 3: SSI before and after the change
Table 3 shows the levels of segregation before and after Individual 4 changes race. Ini-
tially, the segregation of 1, 2, and 3 is unchanged. The segregation of 4 adjusts from 0 to 1.3.
In a second period, 4’s change induces a change in 3’s segregation, but in no other individual.
In a third period, the change reaches (by linearity) individuals 1 and 2. Now, the changes in
1a n d2a ﬀect 3 again, and ultimately 4, and so on. Figure 5 demonstrates how the levels of
24segregation ultimately converge to the levels shown in Table 3, which captures the multiplier
eﬀects inherent in SSI.
G. Graph-theoretic properties of SSI
We provide two results that help interpret the SSI. The ﬁrst relates SSI to how many
neighbors individuals have. The second result shows how SSI measures the connectivity of
the h-race network.
T h ed e g r e eo fav e r t e xv, d(v), is the number of edges at v.Let dmin (C)=m i n{d(v)|v ∈ V }
denote the minimum degree of G, dmax (C)=m a x{d(v)|v ∈ V } represents its maximum de-
gree, and d(C): = 1
|V |
P
v∈V d(v) the average degree of G. If all vertexes of G have the same
degree, then G is regular. In this section we assume the neighborhood model (rij ∈ {0,1} ).
A natural alternative to SSI is the average degree (or average number of own-race social
interactions). We discard the average degree because it fails linearity. The following result
provides a relationship between the measure of spectral segregation of a minority group and
the degree of the minority graph associated with that group.
Proposition 4 Let dmin, d and dmax be the minimum, average, and maximum degrees of
Bh, respectively. Then
dmin ≤ d ≤ ˆ S
h ≤ dmax
Let di be the number of same-race neighbors of household i. Proposition 4 proves that,
Homogeneity notwithstanding, ˆ Sh(β) is larger than the average di over the individuals with
a(i)=h. This relationship is strict when a city is irregular. The intuition is related to the
25feedback mechanism involved in the Linearity axiom. Recall, a household is more segregated
the more segregated its neighbors are, and this cascades through the network similar to our
thought experiment in the previous section. Proposition 4 indicates that the limit of this
process is larger than the average degree of a minority graph.
SSI is a measure of the connectedness of race-h individuals in a network, an interpretation
that was implicit in the discussion in Section E. Now we use walks in a graph to bring out the
relation between SSI and connectivity. A walk of length k is a sequence of (not necessarily
diﬀerent) vertexes v1,v 2, ..., vk,v k+1 such that for each i =1 ,2,..., k there is an edge from
vi to vi+1. A walk is closed if vk+1 = v1. Let Wθ
i be the number of walks of length θ that
individual i ∈ h can take in Bh, and deﬁne Wθ =
P
i Wθ
i .L e tWθ
ij be the number of walks
of length θ between individual i ∈ h and j ∈ h. A graph is bi-partite if its vertex-set admits
a partition into 2 classes such that every edge has its ends in diﬀerent classes. The graphs
one encounters in applications of SSI are never bi-partite.
Proposition 5 For θ suﬃciently large: (1)
Wθ
i
(ˆ Sh(β))θ−1 is approximately proportional to ˆ sh
i (β),
and the constant of proportionality is independent of i;( 2 )
θ p
Wθ/nh(β) approximates ˆ Sh(β);
and (3) if Bh is non-bipartite, Wθ
ij is approximately proportional to (ˆ Sh(β))θ−2ˆ sh
i (β)ˆ sh
j(β).
Proposition 5 (1) says that, as θ grows, Wθ
i (ˆ Sh(β))θ−1 converges. Thus ˆ S measures
t h eg r o w t hi nt h en u m b e ro fw a l k st h a ti can take. Further, it converges to something
proportional to ˆ si, thus individual SSI measures explain the diﬀerences, among individuals,





. The total number of walks will grow at rate ˆ Sh(β) (a statement
26which is similar, and has a similar proof, to that of Proposition 3). Finally, (3) says that two
individuals’ measures are related to how many walks there are between the two individuals,
relative to the total number of walks (given by ˆ Sh(β), in light of Statement (2)).
5 Two Applications of SSI: Measuring Residential and
School Segregation
Here we develop two illustrative applications of SSI: estimating residential segregation, and
racial segregation of friendship networks in schools.
5.1 Residential Segregation
We begin by explaining how we take the model in Section 4 to data. The ﬁrst step involves
constructing the graph Gh(β) of same-race interactions for each race and city that we analyze.
As an example consider Figure 6, which depicts Asian blocks around Downtown Boston. A
block is considered “Asian” if Asians represent the largest share of individuals in that block.
We assume that two blocks are neighbors if they are within one kilometer of each other.
The second panel of Figure 6 illustrates circles of 1 kilometer radius around the centroid
of each Asian block to depict the relevant neighborhood.13 From this, we can construct
the graph of Asians in Downtown Boston. The next step is to calculate the intensities of
13We have used one kilometer radii because one kilometer is the median radius of a census tract (1.03),
and tracts are the traditional notion of neighborhood in the literature. Our results alter little when we
change criterion to 0.5 or 1.5 kilometers.
27neighborhood interactions; the rij of Section 4. We obtain the total number, di, of neighbors
of block i, i.e. the number of blocks that are within one kilometer of i,a n dl e trij be 1/di.
The justiﬁcation for using 1/di is that we think of i as having a budget constraint for
social interactions, and we assume that i spends an equal amount of that budget on all its
neighbors. Of course, if one had more information about these interactions, one could do
something better.
The graph, and the intensities, give us Bh. We then calculate the largest eigenvalue of
(each irreducible submatrix of) Bh, and thus obtain the SSI. 14
A. The Data
The ideal data to estimate residential segregation would contain information on the nature
of interactions with other households. This information is, of course, not available. In
lieu of this, we use block-level data from the 2000 US Census, restricting our sample to all
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs).15 Census blocks contain, on average, 300 households,
and are approximately 100 meters in radius. We identify a block with the race/ethnicity
of the majority of its inhabitants. This assumption is not too problematic, as blocks are
strikingly homogeneous: 94.3% of Iowans live in a homogeneous census block and so do
77% of Texans. Save Washington DC, more than 60% of the blocks in all states contain
households of only one race (for half the states, 80% or more of the blocks contain only one
race).
14The Matlab programs to calculate all indexes reported in the paper are available at
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/fryer/fryer.html
15We have a proposal being reviewed at the US Census Bureau that would provide household level data
for 25 states; those in which it has been collected.
28One issue with our application of SSI to residential segregation is that it ignores block
density.16 To correct for this, one could assign all individuals in a census block to the centroid
of that block, and run the resulting individual-level estimation. This method, however, is
computationally very costly. Measuring the segregation of Chicago amounts to solving the
eigenvalues of a matrix whose dimensions are well over 1 million × 1 million.17
C. Baseline Residential Segregation
Since SSI for race h is a measure of the connectivity of the race-h network (or of the
growth of race-h social capital) it will tend to be larger in cities with larger fractions of
race-h individuals, even if individuals located at random in the city.
We refer to the SSI one would expect to see in a city when individuals locate at random
as Baseline SSI. We provide estimates of both SSI, and of the SSI in excess of Baseline SSI.
We have obtained measures of Baseline SSI by simulating random assignment of races
to large regular (in a graph-theoretic sense) cities with the corresponding fraction of race-
h inhabitants. Figure 7 shows the results of our simulations. On the horizontal axis is
the fraction of race-h inhabitants, while the vertical axis shows the average SSI. When the
share of race-h inhabitants in a city is relatively small, SSI mirrors the percent race-h in
a city closely. This is to be expected. When race-h inhabitants are relatively few and
assigned to a city graph at random, linearity has little power to alter SSI from percent black.
16This likely induces little error in the estimates of segregation, given our deﬁnition of neighbor usually
encompasses several blocks. In areas such as New York, however, this limitation may be quite restrictive.
17Typical cities such as Austin, Texas and Tampa, Florida currently take one day to compute. Imputing
all individuals to the centroid of their block in these cities would increase computing time to approximately
1y e a r .
29As the fraction of race-h individuals increases, however, SSI signiﬁcantly departs from the
percentage of race-h in a city. We have used only large cities, as we can prove (See Appendix
B) that baseline SSI converges as a city grows. In fact the simulations show the convergence
to be quite fast.
D. The Extent of Segregation Across Cities
Table 4 reports the top 10 most segregated cities for Whites, Blacks, Hispanics, and
Asians (including paciﬁc-islanders). Detroit is the most segregated city for Blacks; Lowell,
MA for whites; McAllen, TX for Hispanics and Honolulu, HI for Asians . The list seems
q u i t ei n t u i t i v e .I ta l s oc o n ﬁrms the statement in Section C: SSI is clearly correlated with the
size of a minority group. The latter point begs for a distinction between “raw” segregation,
as measured by SSI, and “behavioral” segregation: the segregation in excess of baseline
segregation. It is unclear which is most closely related to economic outcomes. Behavioral
segregation tells us more about preferences, while the original SSI is a better measure of the
growth of same-race capital. We are agnostic; they simply measure diﬀerent things.
Table 5 reports the top 10 most behaviorally segregated cities. The rankings change
dramatically. Detroit, the most segregated city for Blacks in Table 1, is not even in the top
10. The most segregated cities after taking out the baseline for Asians, Blacks, Hispanics,
and Whites are: Los Angeles, CA; Milwaukee, WI; Flagstaﬀ,A Z ;a n dP i n eB l u ﬀ,A R ,
respectively. Approximately 11% of households in Milwaukee are black, implying a SSI of
.1145. The actual measure of segregation is a factor of 9 larger. Indeed, to generate the
level of SSI in Milwaukee, assuming blocks were assigned a race at random, Blacks need to
30comprise 80% of the population. It is also interesting to note that behavioral segregation
is larger for blacks than for other minorities. That is, the diﬀerence between the actual
percentage, and the one needed to generate the same SSI at random, is largest for blacks.
We have emphasized how the SSI allows one to consider more disaggregated units than
the city. One of the most interesting units is the agglomeration of same-race blocks: racially
homogenous ghettos, which SSI identiﬁes endogenously as connected components (see Sec-
tion 4). This is related to city-wide SSI, but SSI weights the ghetto’s SSI against members
of the same race in other parts of the city, who are more integrated. For Blacks and Whites,
the largest ghetto is Detroit — implying an enormous amount of city-wide segregation. Re-
markably, 87% of black blocks in Detroit comprise one large ghetto. The largest connected
component is San Francisco for Asians, and Los Angeles for Hispanics. Hispanics in Los An-
geles comprise the largest minority ghetto in America; 17,909 Hispanic blocks are connected.
Table 6 provides more facts that are only obtainable with SSI; the top 15 most segregated
blocks in America. A Hispanic block in San Antonio is the most segregated block, followed
by a Black block in Lafayette, LA and an Asian block in Los Angeles.18
Table 7 presents a correlation matrix of popular measures of segregation. These measures
include dissimilarity, isolation, Gini coeﬃcient, exposure, entropy, and interaction. Also
included in the matrix are SSI, SSI minus the baseline, and the ranking of cities based solely
on the their fraction of Blacks. All measures were calculated using data at the census block
18The table reports the most segregated block per unique PMSA. Because of Linearity, the (literal) top
15 most segregated Blocks are all in San Antonio. To avoid this redundancy, we report blocks from unique
PMSAs.
31level for 326 MSAs. The Spectral index has surprisingly little correlation with dissimilarity,
gini, entropy, and interaction — averaging less than .5 — and high correlation with isolation and
exposure; averaging more than .90. Given the nature of the isolation and exposure indexes,
it is not surprising that SSI is more correlated with the measures relative to the others.
However, we did not expect there to be such a striking similarity between them. Thus,
as a measure of residential segregation, our measure is very similar to existing measures
of exposure with the added ability to disaggregate to the level of individuals, and a well-
understood theoretical foundation. Taking out the relevant baseline, SSI becomes even less
correlated with dissimilarity and isolation. The fraction black in a city is highly correlated
with SSI, but linearity assures that this correlation is less than perfect.
E. The Impact of Residential Segregation on Economic Outcomes
The economic literature on the eﬀects of segregation on outcomes is impressive. Case
and Katz (1991) show that youths in a central city are aﬀected by the characteristics of their
neighbors. Almond, Chay, and Greenstone (2003) show that segregation of hospitals in the
Jim Crow era had a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on infant mortality. Using evidence from the
Moving to Opportunity experiment, Katz, Kling, and Liebman (2001) and Kling, Liebman,
and Katz (2005) provide evidence that moving individuals to lower poverty neighborhoods
has substantial eﬀects on mental and physical health of parents and children.
Cutler and Glaeser (1997) is one of the most inﬂuential papers in economics on the
impact of segregation. They use the dissimilarity index as a measure of segregation. We
32re-estimate the impact of black segregation on economic outcomes with Cutler and Glaeser’s
speciﬁcation. Econometrically, we estimate models of the form:
outcomei = X
0
β + β1segregationj + β2segregationj ∗ blacki + εi, (4)
where outcomei is measured at the individual level and segregationj is measured at the MSA
level, and compare the results obtained with SSI and the dissimilarity index.
Identical to Cutler and Glaeser (1997), we correlate measures of segregation with various
economic and social outcomes for young people aged 20-30. We choose to focus on younger
individuals for three reasons. First, they are most susceptible to group level inﬂuences as
a result of social interactions. Second, the problems of mobility across metropolitan areas
is more easily avoided. Third, and most importantly, it mirrors the speciﬁcations in Cutler
and Glaeser (1997). Data from the 5% Census Public Micro Use Sample are used.
Outcome measures are divided into 3 categories: educational attainment, labor market,
and social outcomes. Educational attainment is measured as the probability an individual
graduates from high school or college. There are two measures of labor market outcomes.
The ﬁrst is whether or not an individual is idle (not working and not employed). The
second is earning (sum of wages, salary, and self-employment income). In all speciﬁcations,
we use the natural logarithm of earnings, conditional on the individual not being in school
and reporting positive earnings. The ﬁnal outcome variable is a social outcome — whether
a woman is an unmarried mother. While these may seem like a motley set of outcomes
to include, they are identical to those analyzed in Cutler and Glaeser (1997) and serve as
33proxies for a broad set of social and economic variables.
Tables 8 presents a series of ordinary least squares estimates of the relationship between
segregation and outcomes for persons aged 20-24 and 25-30, using three diﬀerent measures of
segregation. All measures of segregation have been normalized such that they have a mean
of zero and a standard deviation of one. Along with a mutually exclusive and collectively
exhaustive set of racial dummies, we include controls for gender, age dummies in one year
increments, logarithm of MSA population, percent black, median household income and
percent of the labor force employed in manufacturing. Each of these variables are also
interacted with a dummy variable for black. Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level.
The top panel of Table 8 replicates Cutler and Glaeser’s (1997) results using the dis-
similarity index. The bottom two panels estimate the same speciﬁcation using SSI and the
Isolation index. Results diﬀer sharply between SSI and dissimilarity, which is not surprising
given the low correlation between the two indexes reported in Section D. On each outcome,
cities with higher dissimilarity indexes have inferior outcomes: less likely to graduate from
high school or college, more likely to be idle, earn less money, and more likely to be a single
mother. SSI paints a diﬀerent portrait. On every outcome-measure, the eﬀect of segregation
on black outcomes decreases markedly; only idleness and single motherhood are statistically
distinguishable from zero. The bottom panel presents results using the isolation index. As
one might expect, the estimates using the isolation index lie in between the dissimilarity and
SSI extremes, though the results are more in line with the SSI.
It is quite surprising that estimates of the impact of segregation on our set of outcomes
34diﬀer so substantially when one employs the Spectral index in lieu of the dissimilarity index.
Thinking carefully about these diﬀerences and related models of social interaction that can
i n f o r mu sa b o u tw h yo n et y p eo fs e g r e g a t i o ni sw o r s et h a na n o t h e ri sa ni m p o r t a n tl i n eo f
inquiry, which we leave for future work.
5.2 School Segregation
There is a growing literature on the eﬀects of school segregation on achievement. Guryan
(2004) estimates that half of the decline in black dropout rates between 1970 and 1980 is
attributable to desegregation plans. Crain and Strauss (1985) ﬁnd that students randomly
oﬀered the chance to be bussed to a suburban school were more likely to work in professional
jobs nearly 20 years after the experiment. Meta-analytic studies, however, typically ﬁnd
no consensus reached about the eﬀect of school integration on black student achievement
(Armor 2002, Cook 1984, Crain and Mahard 1981, St. John 1975).
While the literature on the relationship between school segregation and achievement has
amassed an impressive array of facts, the vast majority of it has focused on one aspect of
the problem — segregation across schools.19 This is very much in the legacy of the Brown
Decision; ensuring the placement of black kids in traditionally white school so they can get
the beneﬁt of better resources, more qualiﬁed teachers, and so on. Traditional measures of
segregation calculate the fraction of whites at the typical black student’s school (entropy)
or the percentage of blacks that would have to change schools to get an equal distribution
19Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor (2003), which calculates dissimilarity at the classroom level, is a nice
counter-example.
35across a district (dissimilarity). Neither of these indexes are equipped to measure the nature
of interactions within schools.
Estimates of within-school interactions are vitally important for a myriad of educational
policies: ranging from the eﬃcacy of bussing programs to the design of optimal class com-
position. It is one thing to have black kids present in the majority of white schools; it is
something quite diﬀerent to have black students be apart of the social networks of the typical
white kid.
A. The Data
The National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Addhealth) database is a nation-
ally representative sample of 90,118 students entering grades 7 through 12 in the 1994-1995
school year. A stratiﬁed random sample of 20,745 students was given an additional in-home
interview; 17,700 parents of these children were also interviewed. Thus far, information has
been collected on these students at 3 separate points in time: 1995, 1996, and 2002. There
are 175 schools in 80 communities included in the sample, with an average of more than 490
students per school, allowing within school analysis. Students who are missing data on race
or grade level are dropped from the sample.
A wide range of data are gathered on the students, as described in detail on the Ad-
dhealth website (http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/addhealth). For our purposes, the most
interesting and unique aspect of the Addhealth data is the detailed information regarding
friendship associations in schools. All students contained in the in-school survey were asked,
“ L i s ty o u rc l o s e s tm a l e / f e m a l ef r i e n d s . L i s ty o u rb e s tm a l e / f e m a l ef r i e n dﬁrst, then your
36next best friend, and so on.” Students were allowed to list as many as 5 friends from each
sex. Each friend can be linked in the data and the full range of covariates in the in-school
survey (race, gender, grade point average, etc) can be gleaned from each friend.
B .T h eN a t u r eo fS c h o o lS e g r e g a t i o n
The empirical framework we implement here is similar to that employed in Section 5.1.
First, we calculate the spectral index for each school, and for each individual within a
school. The theory requires that all interactions be bilateral. Empirically, however, a non-
trivial portion of students listed as friends individuals who did not list them. There are two
potential ways to handle this: we can include an individual i as a friend if either i or j list
them as a friend; or we can opt for a more restrictive deﬁnition — including i only if both i
and j list them as a friend. We opt for the former — less restrictive — deﬁnition.
Figures 8 depicts the relationship between the percentage of minority students in a school
and the level of segregation for each minority student in that school, using the Addhealth
database. Each observation is a school. Grade levels 7-12 are combined.
Many researchers assume the relationship is linear (see, for example, Orﬁeld 1983). This
seems to be true for Whites, Asians, and to a lesser extent Hispanics. For Blacks, however,
the relationship between percent own-race in a school and own-race segregation is highly non-
linear. As the percentage of black students increases from zero to twenty-ﬁve percent, black
segregation rises sharply. Above twenty-ﬁve percent, Blacks are near complete segregation.
This has important implications for the bussing programs and the optimal organization of
schools, among other things.
37B .T h eI m p a c to fS c h o o lS e g r e g a t i o no nA c a d e m i cA c h i e v e m e n t
Table 9 presents the ﬁrst estimates of individual level measures of segregation on indi-
vidual outcomes. We estimate models of the form:
outcomei = Xβ+ γsegregationi + ξ1black · segregationi + ξ2asian · segregationi
+ξ3hispanic · segregationi + εi,
including school-level ﬁxed eﬀects.
We examine eight outcome variables: 4 social and 4 academic. The social variables
include smoking, skipping school (without a valid excuse), interracial dating, and whether
or not a student is happy at their school. Smoking and skipping school are answers to the
question, “During the past 12 months, how often did you...” Answer choices range from
never to nearly everyday. Interracial dating is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the
student reports ever dating interracially and zero otherwise. Happiness measures whether or
no students report being happy at their school. The academic variables include: Peabody
Vocabulary Test (PVT) scores, whether or not a student plans to attend college, grades
in the previous grading period, and a measure of how much eﬀort the student exerts. All
responses (including grades) are self-reported.
For blacks, individuals who are more segregated are less likely to smoke (a behavior
predominant among white teens) and have lower test scores. Asian students who are more
38connected to each other are less likely to skip school, have lower test scores, put in more
eﬀort, and report being happier. Among Hispanics, more segregation is associated with
less smoking, lower test scores, lower probability of attending college, and lower grades.
Interestingly, students of all races are less likely to date interracially when schools are more
segregated. Similar results are obtained when one excludes school ﬁxed-eﬀects.
6C o n c l u s i o n
For decades, social scientists have used measures of evenness and exposure to estimate the
prevalence and impact of segregation in housing, ﬁrms, and schools. These measures have
many limitations, which we have discussed throughout. This paper develops a new measure
of segregation based on two key ideas: a measure of segregation should disaggregate to the
level of individuals, and an individual is more segregated the more segregated are the agents
with whom they interact. Developing three axioms that any segregation measure should
satisfy, our main result shows that one and only one segregation index satisﬁes our three
axioms, and the two aims mentioned above–the Spectral Segregation Index. To illustrate the
potential of the index, it is applied to two well-known social problems: measuring residential
and school segregation and several new insights are gleaned. We hope the Spectral index
will be a useful tool for applied researchers interested in the agglomeration of individuals in
networks.
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447 Appendix A: Proofs
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 .
The proof of Theorem 1 proceeds by stating and proving 5 lemmas that together establish
the theorem.
The ﬁrst lemma uniﬁes some results about irreducible matrices. Mainly the lemma
restates the Perron-Froebenius Theorem.
Lemma 2 Let C be a real, non-negative, irreducible matrix. Then A has a real, positive,
eigenvalue λ with associated eigenvector y. Such that
1. y is strictly positive, so yi > 0 for all i,a n dy is the unique, up to a scalar multiple,
strictly positive eigenvector of C;
2. λ is larger than |σ|, for any other eigenvalue σ of C; in particular, λ is larger than
any other real eigenvalue.
Proof. By the Perron-Froebenius Theorem (Theorem 8.4.4 in Horn and Johnson), C has
a real, strictly positive, eigenvalue, λ, with associated strictly positive eigenvector y.T h e
multiplicity of λ is one and λ is larger than |σ|, for any other eigenvalue σ of C (λ is the
spectral radius of C).
Let z be any strictly positive eigenvector, by Corollary 8.1.30 in Horn and Johnson, z is
associated to eigenvalue λ.T h ez is a scalar multiple of y,a sλ has multiplicity one.
Now we verify that the spectral segregation index satisﬁes our three axioms.
45Lemma 3 The Spectral Segregation Index satisﬁes Montonicity.
Proof. Let β
0 =( a0,R 0) have more h-segregation than β =( a,R).L e tBh0 denote the
submatrix of B(β
0) whose rows i have h = a0(i).L e tBh denote the corresponding submatrix
of B(β).T h a tβ
0 has more h-segregation than β implies that, if i is a row in Bh,t h e ni is a
row in Bh0.
Let C0 =( c0
ij) be an irreducible submatrix of Bh0. Then the set of rows in C0 is the union
of the rows in some collection C1,C 2,...C L of irreducible submatrices of Bh.L e tC =( cij)
be the block-diagonal matrix with C1,C 2,...C L in its diagonal. Let x0 be an eigenvector
associated to the largest eigenvalue λ
0 of C0.T h e nC0x0 = λ
0x0, xi > 0 for all i (Lemma 2),
and β





















Let λ =m a x{|σ| : σ is an eigenvalue of C} be the spectral radius of C.T h e n ,b yH o r n











Statements (5) and (6) imply that λ ≤ λ
0.B u t λ
0 is SC0(β
0) (Proposition 2); so λ ≤
ˆ SC0(β
0).
Now we prove that ˆ SCl(β) ≤ λ,f o rl =1...L.L e tλl be the largest real eigenvalue of
Cl.L e txl be an eigenvector of Cl, associated to λl;L e ty =( yi)i∈C be the vector obtained
46from xl by letting yi = xli if i ∈ Cl and 0 otherwise. Then, since C is block-diagonal, λl is
an eigenvalue of C, with associated eigenvector y.B yd e ﬁnition of λ,s i n c eλl is real, λl ≤ λ.
But Proposition 2 implies that λl = ˆ SCl(β),s oˆ SCl(β) ≤ λ,f o rl =1...L.
Let C0
k, k =1 ,...K be the irreducible submatrices of Bh0,a n dl e te a c hC0
k be the union
of Lk irreducible submatrices of Bh, C0



































Lemma 4 The Spectral Segregation Index satisﬁes homogeneity.
Proof. Let a ∈ A be h-homogeneous of degree d.L e ty = 1, then homogeneity says that
Ay = d1,s od is an eigenvalue with eigenvector y.B yL e m m a2d must coincide with λ,t h e
largest eigenvalue of B, and the rescaled eigenvector must coincide with x.S oˆ Sh(β)=d.
Lemma 5 The Spectral Segregation Index satisﬁes linearity.
Proof. By Proposition 2, ˆ SCk(β) is an eigenvalue with eigenvector (xi), the eigenvector
























be a segregation index that satisﬁes the three axioms.
Lemma 6 If β =( a,R) is such that bij =0for all i and j with h = a(i)=a(j),t h e n
si(β)=ˆ si(β) for all i with h = a(i).
Proof. By Homogeneity, Sh(β)=0 ,s ow em u s th a v ea n dsi(β)=0for all i with
h = a(i),a ssi(β) ≥ 0 and Sh(β) is the average si(β) over i with h = a(i). Thus the index
coincides with the Spectral Segregation Index.
Lemma 7 For any assignment-interaction pair β, si(β)=ˆ si(β) for all i.
Proof. Let β be an assignment-interaction pair. Fix h and let Bh(β)=( bij) If β is such
that bij =0for all i and j, we are done by Lemma 6. Suppose that bij > 0 for at least one i
and j.
48Let γ =m i n{bij : bij > 0}. Let D =( dij) be the matrix deﬁned by dij =0if bij =0 ,a n d
dij =
γ
|{j : bij > 0}|
if bij > 0.L e t β
0 =( a,R0) be the assignment-interaction pair that diﬀers from β in that
submatrix for the i with h = a(i) is D. Then, for all i with h = a(i),
P
i∈hr1
ij = γ.S oβ
0 is
h-homogeneous of degree γ. By homogeneity, Sh(β
0)=γ.
Now, for all i with h = a(i),a n dj, rij ≤ bij.S oβ has more h-segregation than β
0.A n d
nh(β
0)=|a−1 (h)| = nh(β). Monotonicity implies then Sh(β) ≥ Sh(β
0)=γ.S oSh(β) > 0.
Fix a component Ck such that SCk(β) > 0;s i n c eSh(β) > 0 there must exist at least one.
For i ∈ Ck,l e txi =
sh
i (β)
|Ck|Sh(β). Note that, by deﬁnition of SCk(β)xi,
P
i∈Ck xi =1 .




i rijsj/SCk(β),b yL i n e a r i t y .T h e nSCk(β)xi =
P
j∈Na
i rijxj.S oSCk(β)x = Ckx; SCk(β) is an eigenvalue of Ck with eigenvector x.
Now, si(β) > 0 for all i.S i n c esi(β)=0for some i would imply, by Linearity, that all
j ∈ Na
i have sj(β)=0 . Then, by recursion, sj(β)=0for all j ∈ Ck, which would contradict
that SCk(β) > 0. Hence x is a strictly positive eigenvector.
By Proposition 2 and Lemma 2 now SCk(β)=ˆ SCk(β), and by the rescaling
P
i∈Ck xi =1 ,
x must coincide with the deﬁning eigenvector in the deﬁnition of the spectral segregation
index. Then, si(β)=ˆ si(β) for all i.
Finally, take a component with SCk(β)=0 . Then Monotonicity and Lemma 6 imply
that bij =0for all i and j in Ck.
Lemmas (3) through (7), taken together, establish the theorem.
49Proof of Proposition 1 If i ∈ h has at least one same-race neighbor, then i is in Ck,
for some irreducible submatrix Ck.L e t λk be the largest eigenvalue of Ck,a n dxk be its
associated eigenvector. By Lemma 2, xk is strictly positive, so xki > 0.S i n c e λk > 0
(Lemma 2), the deﬁnition of ˆ sh
i (β) implies that ˆ sh
i (β) > 0. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2





i∈Ck xi.S i n c e x was normalized so that
P
i∈Ck xi =1 , it follows that SCk(β)=λk.
That Sh(β) is the weighted average of the SCk(β) follows immediately by deﬁnition of Sh(β)
and SCk(β). ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3Let I denote the nh(β)×nh(β) identity matrix. Let D = I+Bh(β).
Then equation 3 implies that the vector xt =( xit)i satisﬁes xt = Dxt−1, for all t.S o
xt = Dtx0. By Lemma 8.4.2 in Horn and Johnson, 1+ˆ Sh(a) is the largest eigenvalue of D.
By Lemma 8.2.7 in Horn and Johnson, there is a matrix L such that
lim









((1 + ˆ Sh(a))−tDtx0)i
((1 + ˆ Sh(a))−t+1Dt−1x0)i
→ (1 + ˆ S
h(a))
¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4See Cvetkovic and Rowlinson (1990).¥
Proof of Proposition 5 Let U =( ui) be the eigenvectors of Bh, normalized to form an
50orthonormal basis, so UTU = I.L e t D be the matrix with the eigenvalues of Bh on the
diagonal, and 0 everywhere else. So A = UDUT.
If 1 is the vector with 1 in all its entries, the vector of θ-long walks (Wθ
i ) is deﬁned by
(Wθ
i )=Aθ1.S o(Wθ

















iλiui.L e t λ1 = Sh; λ1 has multiplicity 1, as Bh
has a unique non-trivial eigenvector (Theorem 2.1.3 in Cvetkovic, Rowlinson and Simic). So























1 → 0 for all i 6=1 .S i n c eu1 is a scalar multiple of the (xi) vector in the deﬁnition
of the spectral index, Sh(β)ξ1u1 is a scalar multiple of sh
i .
The second statement is a theorem of Cvetkovic, stated in the survey by Cvetkovic and
Rowlinson (1990). The third statement is essentially Theorem 2.2.5 in Cvetkovic, Rowlinson
and Simic. ¥
518 Appendix B: Baseline Segregation
Here we present a theoretical justiﬁcation for our “baseline” simulations. SSI converges as a
city’s size grows, so we can estimate SSI for relatively large cities (the size of 6400 is enough
in our simulations).
Let H = {0,1} be the set of races. We are interested in only one race here, so working
with H = {0,1} is without loss of generality. Let Vn be set of households, such that if n ≤ m
then Vn ⊆ Vm.
Let Ωn = HVn be the set of possible assignments of households to races. Endow the
power set of Ωn with the probability measure pk obtained by letting each household be race






be the expected value of the SSI.
Proposition 6 There is S such that En ↑ S as n →∞ .







Since the EnS are bounded above by 1, the result follows.
Let qn,m be the probability distribution on HVm\Vn induced by letting each household
52be race 1 with probability π ∈ (0,1), independently of the races of other households.
Abusing notation, we shall use qn,m for the probability distribution induced by qn,m on
n

















































53Figure 1: Segregation in Metropolitan DetroitAB
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Figure 8: The Relationship Between Group Size and Group Segregation, By RaceWhites SSI Blacks SSI Asians SSI Hispanics SSI
Lowell, MA 0.99984 Detroit, MI 0.95421 Honolulu, HI 0.93403 McAllen, TX 0.9585
Lawrence, MA 0.99984 Monroe, LA 0.94912 San Francisco, CA 0.8056 Laredo, TX 0.9497
Nashua, NH 0.99966 Milwaukee, WI 0.93605 San Jose, CA 0.71692 Los Angeles, CA 0.939
Sharon, PA 0.99952 Flint, MI 0.93027 Los Angeles,  CA 0.65878 El Paso, TX 0.9256
Boston, MA 0.99949 Pine Bluff, AR 0.92744 Vallejo, CA 0.63447 San Antonio, TX 0.9048
York, PA 0.99947 Chicago, IL 0.9206 Oakland, CA 0.56615 Brownsville, TX 0.8769
Barnstable, MA 0.99947 Memphis, TN 0.9166 Anaheim, CA 0.53402 Tuscon, AZ 0.8654
Johnstown, PA 0.99944 Miami, FL 0.91513 Seattle, WA 0.52639 Anaheim,  CA 0.8624
Providence, RI 0.99943 Birmingham, AL 0.91449 New York, NY 0.47642 Corpus Christi, TX 0.8322
Springfield, MA 0.99933 Gary, IN 0.91418 San Diego, CA 0.41735 Albuquerque, NM 0.8246
Table 4: Top 10 Most Segregated Cities, by Racial Group
Notes: Calculations performed using block-level data from from all MSAs in the 2000 US Census. The sample 
includes all census blocks in all MSAs. Racial categories are mutually exclusive. Asians include Pacific Islanders.Blacks
PMSA SSI-Baseline SSI % Minority % Needed to Give SSI
Milwaukee, WI 0.82155 0.93605 0.11 0.80
Saginaw Bay, MI 0.79187 0.89757 0.1 0.72
Indianapolis, IN 0.77346 0.87916 0.1 0.68
Omaha, NE 0.77144 0.83954 0.07 0.63
Chicago, IL 0.7712 0.9206 0.14 0.76
Wichita, KS 0.7685 0.8298 0.06 0.62
Toledo, OH 0.76485 0.85475 0.09 0.64
Fort Wayne, IN 0.75505 0.80525 0.05 0.60
Los Angeles, CA 0.7545 0.8444 0.09 0.63
Buffalo, NY 0.74787 0.83777 0.09 0.63
Whites
Pine Bluff, AR 0.46306 0.90166 0.38 0.72
Honolulu, HI 0.44971 0.66641 0.2 0.53
Los Angeles, CA 0.27402 0.97952 0.55 0.93
Albany, GA 0.26953 0.90433 0.51 0.73
Sumter, SC 0.26029 0.86269 0.49 0.65
Memphis, TN 0.24103 0.94653 0.55 0.83
Jackson, MS 0.19891 0.90441 0.55 0.73
Monroe, LA 0.19399 0.97809 0.59 0.93
Oakland, CA 0.18802 0.97212 0.59 0.91
Flagstaff, AZ 0.18247 0.94837 0.58 0.83
Asians
Los Angeles, CA 0.54428 0.65878 0.11 0.53
Oakland, CA 0.41675 0.56615 0.14 0.47
San Francisco, CA 0.6283 0.8056 0.17 0.60
Honolulu, HI 0.37023 0.93403 0.47 0.80
New York, NY 0.39272 0.47642 0.08 0.41
Orange County, CA 0.40882 0.53402 0.12 0.45
San Diego, CA 0.35605 0.41735 0.06 0.37
San Jose, CA 0.49312 0.71692 0.21 0.55
Seattle, WA 0.45829 0.52639 0.07 0.44
Vallejo, CA 0.56637 0.63447 0.07 0.51
Hispanics
Flagstaff, AZ 0.71812 0.78622 0.07 0.59
Orange County, CA 0.63855 0.86235 0.21 0.65
Bridgeport, CT 0.59928 0.68918 0.09 0.54
Milwaukee, WI 0.59905 0.63585 0.04 0.51
Tucson, AZ 0.58659 0.86539 0.26 0.66
Lawrence, MA 0.58459 0.67449 0.09 0.53
Fort Worth, TX 0.5657899 0.74309 0.17 0.57
Philadelphia, PA 0.56206 0.59886 0.04 0.49
San Diego, CA 0.54279 0.77799 0.22 0.59
Chicago, IL 0.54143 0.65593 0.11 0.52
Table 5: The Top 'Behaviorally' Segregated Cities, By Racial Group
Notes: Calculations performed using block-level data from from all MSAs in the 2000 US Census. 
The sample includes all census blocks in all MSAs. Racial categories are mutually exclusive. Asians 
include Pacific Islanders. Baseline SSI calculated from simulations described in Section 5.1.C.PMSA Race CC SSI Size of CC Latitude Longitude Block SSI
San Antonio, TX Hispanic 0.995 6166 29.40878 -98.52187 292.260
Lafayette, LA Black 0.833 406 30.53489 -92.08582 96.407
Los Angeles, CA Asian 0.871 751 33.9731 -117.9167 94.085
Houston, TX Hispanic 0.735 226 29.55255 -95.81261 87.263
Brownsville, TX Hispanic 0.877 559 26.20365 -97.68172 82.148
Fresno, CA Hispanic 0.919 1714 36.73535 -119.8122 66.056
Atlanta, GA Black 0.992 6498 33.76681 -84.41813 62.625
Washington, DC Black 0.993 6465 38.92611 -76.99167 57.627
McAllen, TX Hispanic 0.988 3541 26.27484 -98.20446 56.180
Tallahassee, FL Black 0.878 171 30.58215 -84.59776 45.379
Corpus Christi, TX Hispanic 0.965 1116 27.69691 -97.36656 40.777
Oakland, CA Black 0.837 1567 37.77278 -122.2013 39.056
San Diego, CA Hispanic 0.958 2083 32.71384 -117.0652 38.918
Jackson, MS Black 0.996 1828 32.30819 -90.20749 38.847
Columbus, GA Black 0.957 1157 32.43829 -84.95276 34.448
Table 6: Top 15 Most Segregated Blocks
Notes: The table reports the most segregated block per unique PMSA. Calculations performed using 
block-level data from from all MSAs in the 2000 US Census. The sample includes all census blocks in 
all MSAs. Racial categories are mutually exclusive. Asians include Pacific Islanders. Baseline SSI 
calculated from simulations described in Section 5.1.C. SSI Dissimilarity Isolation Exposure Entropy Gini % Black Interaction SSI-Baseline
SSI 1
Dissimilarity 0.419 1
Isolation 0.9283 0.5594 1
Exposure 0.9097 0.594 0.9538 1
Entropy 0.4726 -0.3811 0.3614 0.3434 1
Gini 0.4563 0.9953 0.6009 0.6266 -0.365 1
Percent Black 0.8973 0.3055 0.9224 0.8432 0.5633 0.3498 1
Interaction 0.4684 -0.3518 0.3743 0.3398 0.9835 -0.3328 0.5678 1
SSI-Baseline 0.8913 0.3882 0.7382 0.8007 0.2 0.4112 0.6149 0.1823 1
Table 7: Correlation Between Existing Measures of Segregation and the Spectral Index
Notes: All calculations performed using block-level data from from all MSAs in the 2000 US Census. The sample includes all census blocks in all MSAs. Baseline 

















Dissimilarity -0.014 .098 -.034 .058 .043 -.003 .079 -.026 -.082 .079
(.026) (.046) (.031) (.084) (.024) (.019) (.080) (.031) (.088) (.017)
Dissimilarity*Black -.288 -.145 .432 -.344 .340 -.214 -.311 .331 -.249 .303
(.046) (.044) (.069) (.179) (.080) (.041) (.072) (.047) (.133) (.077)
SSI -.001 .009 -.011 .018 .001 -.000 .015 -.011 -.009 .001
(.004) (.007) (.004) (.009) (.003) (.003) (.011) (.004) (.012) (.002)
SSI*Black -.017 -.007 .025 -.082 .037 -.002 -.021 .013 -.028 .025
(.009) (.007) (.012) (.031) (.016) (.007) (.012) (.011) (.022) (.012)
Isolation -.002 .011 -.004 .009 .006 .000 .005 -.001 -.018 .011
(.004) (.007) (.005) (.013) (.003) (.003) (.013 (.005) (.014) (.003)
Isolation*Black -.042 -.020 .061 -.061 .051 -.030 -.040 .041 -.047 .033
(.007) (.007) (.011) (.028) (.012) (.006) (.011) (.008) (.018) (.012)
Number of Observations 62,797 62,797 62,797 28,092 31,861 81,537 81,537 81, 537 54,141 41,933
Notes: Dependent variables vary by column. All calculations performed using 2000 Census data from the 5% Public Use Micro Sample. 
Segregation indices are calculated at the census block-level and normalized such that each has a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. Controls 
include gender, age dummies in one year increments, logarithm of MSA population, percent black, median household income and percent of the 
labor force employed in manufacturing. Each of these variables are also interacted with a dummy variable for black. Standard errors are 
clustered at the MSA level.
Table 8: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of the Effects of Segregation on Outcomes, by Measure of Segregation
Age 20-24 Age 25-30
Education Income Education IncomeSmoking Skip School Interracial Dating Happiness PVT Scores No College Grades Effort
Black -0.143** -0.010** 0.085** -0.091** -0.424** -0.013* -0.216** 0.027**
0.004 0.003 0.017 0.007 0.026 0.006 0.011 0.002
Asian -0.081** -0.008* 0.372** -0.025* -0.303** -0.047** 0.258** 0.036**
0.006 0.004 0.029 0.010 0.042 0.007 0.015 0.003
Hispanic -0.040** 0.026** 0.460** -0.016* -0.426** 0.065** -0.182** 0.003
0.005 0.003 0.017 0.007 0.026 0.006 0.010 0.002
Individual SSI 0.000 0.000 -0.007** 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000
Black*Individual SSI -0.003* -0.001 -0.004 0.003 -0.025* 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.001 0.001 0.009 0.003 0.013 0.003 0.005 0.001
Asian*Individual SSI -0.006 -0.008** -0.067** 0.021** -0.102** 0.000 0.017 0.004*
0.005 0.002 0.017 0.006 0.030 0.007 0.014 0.002
Hispanic*Individual SSI -0.006* -0.002 -0.015 0.004 -0.047** 0.012** -0.013** 0.004**
0.003 0.002 0.014 0.004 0.014 0.003 0.004 0.001
Age 0.029** 0.009** -0.002 -0.037** -0.034** 0.021** -0.024** -0.011**
0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.001
Male -0.002 0.019** 0.004 0.047** 0.124** 0.085** -0.184** -0.047**
0.003 0.002 0.008 0.004 0.014 0.003 0.006 0.001
Mother College Educated -0.024** -0.002 0.001 0.031** 0.099** -0.080** 0.154** 0.006**
0.004 0.002 0.010 0.005 0.019 0.004 0.008 0.002
Father College Educated -0.032** -0.010** 0.014 0.021** 0.078** -0.075** 0.163** 0.013**
0.004 0.002 0.012 0.005 0.021 0.004 0.008 0.002
Mother Professional -0.002 -0.001 0.011 -0.006 0.067** -0.024** 0.062** 0.003*
0.004 0.002 0.010 0.005 0.019 0.004 0.007 0.002
Father Professional -0.008* 0.000 0.018 0.022** 0.127** -0.048** 0.114** 0.001
0.004 0.002 0.011 0.005 0.020 0.004 0.008 0.002
Constant -0.220** -0.108** 0.117* 1.134** 0.725** -0.125** 3.216** 0.989**
0.017 0.011 0.049 0.022 0.088 0.019 0.035 0.008
Observations 78075 77903 9553 73837 14387 69257 72744 79599
R-squared 0.07 0.04 0.37 0.05 0.28 0.1 0.18 0.08
Notes: Dependent variables vary by column. In all cases, dummy variables for missing values and school fixed effects are included. 
Robust standard errors are beneath the coefficients. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Table 9: The Effect of Individual Level Segregation on Social and Academic Outcomes
Social Academic